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ABSTRACT PAGE

A new form of environmentalism is shifting focus on the ecological behaviors of individuals. While
environmental attitudes remain high, there is ample research and other indicators that it does not
necessarily lead to ecological behavior. Cognitive dissonance has been shown to reduce this gap,
especially when the self-concept is involved. A key component of cognitive dissonance is the
realization of hypocrisy between attitudes and behaviors. The current study addresses two points,
asking the following. First, is hypocrisy an agent in the environmental attitude-behavior gap?
Second, can self-concept threat that is different from cognitive dissonance paradigms have a
similar reduction in the environmental attitude-behavior gap?
Only one of three hypotheses, that of a weak attitude-behavior link, was supported. Hypotheses
regarding environmental hypocrisy and the impact of self-concept threat on the attitude-behavior
gap were not supported. While the researcher expected to find low ecological behavior and a
way to increase it, instead, he found high ecological behavior and a way to decrease it. The
results indicate that environmental attitude and situational factors did influence ecological
behavior. The discussion addresses alternative explanations, such as an “environmental quota”,
and directions for future research.
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Introduction
With widespread agreement in the scientific community that human activity
contributes to global warming, there is a new urgency in changing attitudes and behaviors
to rein in greenhouse gas emission (Uzzell & Rathzel, 2009). While early environmental
movement efforts dealt with conserving parks that may be thousands of miles away,
current actions have shifted focus on individuals’ daily activities. Since 2006, the year
when global warming took center-stage (MacDonald, 2008), new questions are hitting
closer to home— do you recycle, how much trash do you generate, and what is your
carbon footprint?
Environmental awareness and pro-environmental attitudes are gaining popular
attention. Indirect indicators reflect a growing prevalence of the new form of
environmentalism, focused on individuals. On June 4, 2008, the global media and
entertainment company Discovery Communications replaced one of its 29 network
brands, Discovery Home Channel, with a channel dedicated to environmental shows,
Planet Green (Ashoka.org, 2008). Benz (2000) showed that the use of “eco-“ in lexicon
of select newspapers increased from 13 in 1988 to 240 in 1998. In 2008, EBSCOHost, a
provider of searchable journal databases used by academics and scholars, added
GreenFile, a database that “offers well-researched information covering all aspects of
human impact to the environment” (GreenFile database description in
http://web.ebscohost.com).
Consumer attitudes and self-reported behaviors also reflect a new
environmentalism. Sixty percent of American consumers say they seeking out green
products—those thought to have less harmful impact on the environment than traditional
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products. Sixty-six percent said they have not reduced spending on green products in the
2009 economy— noted as the biggest economic recession since the Great Depression of
the 1930’s (Pendery, 2009).
Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones (2000) highlight a modest increase in
endorsement of their New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), a prominent scale of
environmental attitudes, over a 14-year period. They posit that a “ceiling effect” reduced
the size o f the impact as compared to a period before a major shift in the 1960’s—the socalled environmental decade.
Despite the increase in environmental attitudes, research has shown a gap, or
inconsistency, between environmental attitudes and ecological behavior.
For example, Bickman (1972) showed that whereas 94% of participants were in favor of
removing litter, only 1.4% picked up trash left by experimenters. Bird, Wtistenhagen, and
Aabakken (2002) reported that while 50-90% of participants say they support renewable
energy and are willing to pay a small premium for it, less than 2 % actually subscribe to
renewable energy options. Whitmarsh (2009) reports an increase in energy usage in the
United Kingdom in recent years. Although industrial energy usage declined, it increased
in areas most directly linked to individual behaviors—transportation and domestic energy
usage. The study goes on to claim that many European countries may not reach their
voluntary Kyoto Protocol targets for reducing carbon emissions by 2010. Van Rijnsoever,
Faria, and Dijst (2009) showed that while 66 % of their Netherlands sample had positive
attitudes toward environmental factors in an automobile, only 11% of them take action
such as driving less or buying a more environmentally responsible car.
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These examples point to a potential gap between attitudes and the behaviors
related to those attitudes. Should policy efforts wish to address final behaviors, they must
understand how to overcome this gap. Before continuing on to the attitude-behavior gap,
a little definition is in order. First, the usage of attitudes for the purposes of this study will
be reviewed, followed by comment on behaviors.
Attitudes
The meaning o f attitudes in social psychology research has evolved over the years.
Albarracin, Johnson, and Zanna’s The Handbook o f Attitudes (2005) provide a succinct
conceptualization of attitudes as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (p.4). Therefore, the
term environmental attitude will refer to participants’ range o f positive to negative
evaluations regarding the natural environment.
There is also some inconsistency between the usages of “environmental” and
“ecological.” In this work, “environmental” will refer to attitudes, whereas “ecological”
will refer to behavior. This is consistent with the PsycINFO database classification of
these subject words (Kaiser, Ranney, Hartig, & Bowler, 1999). Therefore, ecological
behavior will refer to actions thought to have less harmful impact on the environment
than traditional actions used to achieve the same means.
Behaviors
One might think that actual behaviors are easier to define than attitudes. However,
in the realm o f environmental psychology, there remains substantial variation on what
constitutes ecological behavior. Stem (2000) distinguishes impact-oriented and intentoriented behavior, proposing to focus on impact-oriented as a way to make a true impact
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on the environment. Among the several types of imp act-oriented behaviors identified by
Stem (2000), throughout this paper, ecological behaviors will refer to Stem ’s “privatesphere environmentally significant behavior” (2000, p. 409). These are behaviors that the
individual has control over, and have received the greatest amount of research. Though
each private-sphere behavior has little impact, the aggregate across many individuals
leads to significant impact. Examples of private-sphere environmentally significant
behavior include purchase of major household goods and services that have a significant
environmental impact (e.g., automobiles, energy for the home, recreational travel), the
use and maintenance of goods that impact the environment (e.g., home heating and
cooling systems), household waste disposal, and “green” consumption (e.g., recycled
products and organic food) (Stem, 2000, p. 409-410).
A lack of empirical data leads to ambiguity about what constitutes ecological
behavior. Often, individuals are only able to act based on intent, without a clear
connection to impact. As an example, the purchase of locally grown foods has widely
been presented as environmentally beneficial, in that it reduces the amount of
transportation required to deliver the food to the end-user. Yet, in the book
SuperFreakonomics (Levitt & Dubner, 2009), economist Steven Levitt uses actual data to
show that there is little, and perhaps negative, impact as most of the energy required for
our food goes to production. Saving on transportation may be offset if the local climate
requires much more resources to produce the food than a fertile, but distant, production
site.
A main challenge for environmental psychology research is the difficulty in
measuring behaviors. Many studies rely on self-reports of behaviors, garnishing criticism
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in social psychology in general (Aronson, 1992) and environmental psychology in
particular (Corral-Verdugo, 1997). Biga (2006) has a specific critique that much of the
ecological behavior research deals more with behavioral intent, rather than actual
behaviors. There are examples of studies that address this point, and measure specific
behaviors (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 1992). However, this often leads to
tedious procedures, and is limited in scope and complexity. This researcher will attempt
to measure actual behavior, though under the control of an experimental setting.
Attitude-behavior Gap
Social psychologists have long been aware that there can be a gap between
attitude and behavior. In his review of over 30 studies from the 1930’s until 1969, Wicker
(1969) found little correlation between attitudes and behavior. He concluded by warning
against assumptions of behavior based solely on measured attitudes. Environmental
attitudes are no safer from this gap than the topics reviewed by Wicker (1969) - work,
minority treatment, cheating, and health.
A prominent theory addressing the attitude-behavior link in social psychology is
the theory o f planned behavior (Azjen, 1991). A key component of the model is the
specificity between attitudes and the related behavior. Additionally, the theory proposes a
structural model with latent variables beyond just specific attitudes and behavior. The
model states that in addition to specific attitudes, perceived control and subjective norms
determine behavioral intent. This behavioral intent then leads to the actual behavior.
Kaiser, Hiibner, & Bogner (2005) have applied the theory of planned behavior to
environmental attitudes and behaviors.
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Examples presented earlier have shown ecological behaviors not corresponding
to seemingly high environmental attitudes. Other studies have shown a relationship
between attitudes and behavior, though the effect is often weak. Van Liere and Dunlap
(1978) found that both awareness of consequences and ascription of responsibility were
necessary to impact yard burning behavior. Kurz, Linden, and Sheehy (2007) found that
strength o f community and socio-economic status had as much and more, respectively,
impact on recycling as did attitudes toward recycling. Poortinga, Steg, and Vlek (2004)
found that while attitudinal measures were significant with regard to acceptance of
energy-saving measures (Stem ’s intent-oriented behavior), contextual factors had more
significant impact on measures o f actual home and transportation energy use (Stem’s
impact-oriented behavior). Schultz and Zelezny (1998) found that general environmental
concern did not predict participation in a recycling program, but instead predicted the
quantity recycled per participant. Scott and Willits (1994) showed weak correlation
between the New Environmental Paradigm and ecological behavior, with other social
characteristics providing more predictive value. Van Liere and Dunlap (1981) showed
that three different measures of environmental concern were not equivalent, and neither
was very strong. Vining and Ebreo (1992) found that while general environmental
attitudes increased over time with a new recycling program, they were only moderately
related to specific recycling attitudes.
Different research approaches have tried to address the gap between
environmental attitudes and behavior. Some include moderating factors such as difficulty
of the behavior (Schultz, Oskamp, & Mainieri, 1995), others address more specificity
between attitude and behavior (Vining & Ebreo, 2002), and several include linear
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modeling based on the theory of planned behavior (Kaiser, Hubner, & Bogner, 2005) or
value-belief-norm theory (Kaiser et al., 2005; Slimak & Dietz, 2006; Stem, 2000).
However, one area o f study has shown an ability to influence the relationship between
attitude and behavior, by relying on recognition of hypocrisy. This is the use of cognitive
dissonance.
Cognitive Dissonance
Leon Festinger originally proposed Cognitive Dissonance Theory in 1957
(Festinger, 1957). This theory relies on inconsistencies leading to arousal of dissonance.
By holding two contradictory ideas (e.g., that we need to conserve water, yet we use a lot
of water), an uncomfortable feeling arises. People have a motivational drive to reduce
this resulting uncomfortable feeling, or dissonance, by changing their attitudes (e.g.,
concluding that conserving water really is not that important) or behaviors (e.g., taking
shorter showers). However, other researchers found that all inconsistencies are not
equally disturbing and therefore equally likely to produce cognitive dissonance. Festinger
(1957) did not precisely state the possible sources of variation in the dissonance produced.
Later research has attempted to strengthen the theory on this point. Aronson (1992;
Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962) suggests that the feeling of cognitive dissonance depends on
whether important elements of one’s self-concept (i.e., being consistent, competent, or
morally good) are threatened.
By building his approach off Aronson’s version of dissonance theory, with
concern for self-concept, Thogersen (2004) showed that many ecological behaviors are in
fact correlated once several conditions, among them participants’ recognition of
inconsistencies, are controlled for. Participants identified as recognizing low similarity

between recycling and buying organic food had smaller correlations between such
behaviors than those identified as recognizing a high similarity. Therefore, it is the
individual’s recognition of similarity that influenced behavioral correlation, and not what
may seem a behavioral inconsistency to an outsider. Other studies have used cognitive
dissonance to underscore similarity of attitude and behavior, thereby increasing
ecological behaviors (Aitken, McMahon, Wearing, & Finlayson, 1994; Dickerson et al.,
1992; Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984).
A brief summary o f the Dickerson and colleagues (1992) study will serve as an
example. This study was a field experiment performed at a pool and shower room to
measure the impact o f arousing dissonance on water conservation. In a 2x2 factorial
design, the researchers included a mindfulness factor— where some were reminded that
they sometimes waste water— and a commitment factor— where some were asked to
make a public argument to taking shorter showers. The results showed that those in the
dissonance condition— making a public argument and being reminded that they
sometimes waste water—but not in the other conditions, reduced their shower times. This
study showed a method for actually increasing the prevalence of ecological behavior.
That same year, one of the authors, Elliott Aronson, wrote an article on the return
o f cognitive dissonance (Aronson, 1992). Key in Aronson’s position is the notion that at
that time social psychology research was trying to revive motivational aspects to explain
behavior. Motivation may be a concept that helps to explain parts o f the attitude-behavior
gap. Aronson (1992) also restated his version of cognitive dissonance; noting that
individuals strive for three things related to their self-concept— to be consistent,
competent, and morally good.
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Two main points are o f note in these two Aronson articles from 1992 (Aronson,
1992; Dickerson et al., 1992). These are the notion of invoking a sense of hypocrisy and
Aronson’s long-standing notion that self-concept is a key component to cognitive
dissonance. These two concepts are foundational to the current study. However, instead
of invoking them to promote ecological behavior, I will try to uncover whether these two
concepts can provide new insight into the attitude-behavior gap. If revealing hypocrisy
can invoke more ecological behavior, could some of the attitude-behavior gap be
explained by hidden hypocrisy?
Hypocrisy
The Encarta Dictionary (1999) defines hypocrisy as: (noun) the false claim to or
pretense of having admirable principles, beliefs, or feelings. In the framework of
Aronson’s cognitive dissonance, hypocrisy would violate the desire for one to be
consistent, as well as to be morally good. Another view of hypocrisy is demonstrated by
Goffman (1959); who presents the notion of appearance management in terms of staging.
People present a certain self to the public, or front stage, while reserving a separate self
for closer others, or back stage. With regard to environmental presentation, our changing
social norms may be driving people to a more environmental presentation. However,
while some truly embrace that perspective, others may merely present it in public, while
internally they take a much less environmental stance. Uzzell and Rathzel (2009) propose
a similar approach of considering people as “social actors”, in their work on
“transformative environmental psychology.” In fact, Webster’s Dictionary (1989)
attributes the etymology of the word hypocrisy to the Greek work hypokrisis-zcX of
playing a part on the stage.
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For an example o f research that deals with the concepts of hypocrisy and
morality, we now turn to the work of Batson and colleagues. These studies show how
(

hypocrisy can be uncovered when some try to appear moral without having to act that
way.
Batson’s work on moral hypocrisy.
In a series of studies, Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, and Wilson
(1997), tried to “unmask” hypocrisy relating to moral action. They presented participants
with a choice o f two tasks; one was more desirable and offered a chance for a reward
(raffle tickets) while the other was neutral and boring, with no chance for reward. What
instigated the moral dilemma was that the actual participants were told that a second
participant (fictitious) would be assigned the task opposite what they selected, without
the second participant (fictitious) knowing that the actual participant was responsible for
the assignments. The results showed that 80% of participants assigned themselves to the
more desirable task, even though less than 10% said that doing so was moral. This result
parallels the environmental attitude-behavior gaps presented earlier.
When the morality of the choice was underscored by telling participants that most
people think that both should be given a chance by flipping a coin. H alf of these
participants chose to flip a coin. O f those that did not flip the coin, 90% assigned
themselves to the desirable task. Flipping the coin seemed to make no difference, as 90%
of those that flipped the coin still assigned themselves to the desirable task (as opposed to
the expected chance outcome of 50%). Batson and colleagues termed this tendency to
want to appear moral but failing to do so if there is a personal cost as moral hypocrisy. Of
note is that Batson and Thompson (2001) point out that the attitude-behavior gap is not
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due to thinking about it— experiments where the attitude-behavior “link” was obvious
differed little from unidentified cases. They point to it being motivational in nature,
which ties in well with Aronson’s 1992 stance on the significance of cognitive
dissonance in combining cognitive and motivational perspectives of social psychology.
Batson and colleagues followed up their study to better understand the
mechanisms of moral hypocrisy. This included inducing self-awareness by sitting in front
of a mirror (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999), allowing the
experimenter to flip a coin (Batson, Tsang, & Thompson, 2000 as cited in Batson &
Thompson, 2001), and two forms of perspective taking (Batson, Lishner, Carpenter,
Dulin, Harjusola-Webb, Stocks, et al., 2003). The findings reveal that focusing on selfconcept (i.e., sitting in front of a mirror, letting another flip the coin, and perspective
taking) led to a reduction in hypocritical behavior.
Self-concept
Brehm, Kassin, and Finn (2002) define self-concept as: (noun) the sum total of an
individual’s beliefs about his or her own personal attributes. Though referring to a “sum
total”, the self-concept nonetheless is a conglomerate of many attributes, circumstances,
and time.
As noted previously, Aronson believes that self-concept— specifically being
consistent, competent, and morally good— is a crucial part of cognitive dissonance theory
(Aronson, 1992). He proclaims that violation of one’s self-concept drives feelings of
dissonance in cognitive dissonance paradigms. If hypocrisy might be a hidden component
to the attitude-behavior gap, could self-concept be a key to attitude-behavior consistency?
Cognitive dissonance experiments, in particular the Dickerson and colleagues (1992)
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water conservation study, as well as the Batson studies that invoked self-concept
(Batson et al., 1999; Batson et al., 2000 as cited in Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson et
al., 2003) seem to justify that.
Sociology research has begun to probe the role of self-concept, through the lens of
identity theory, on ecological behavior. Stets and Biga (2003) bring an interesting
perspective on the attitude-behavior gap in environmental research. Taking a sociological
view, they propose that identity theory (similar to psychology’s self-concept) is the
missing component linking attitudes and behavior. By measuring environmental attitudes
and environmental identity— “the set of environmentally relevant self-meanings that one
projects and sustains” (p. 417)—their study showed that environmental attitudes lost
significance once controlling for environmental identity. They argue that identity theory’s
power lies in considering the person’s multifaceted identity, embedded within social
structures, as a guide to choices. This addresses Uzzell and Rathzel’s (2009) criticism of
other environmental research for being too linear and ignoring other social circumstances.
Identity theory is able to address how multiple identities interact in a hierarchy, leading to
better correspondence between attitudes and behavior. The Batson studies and Dickerson
et al. show that invoking or threatening self-concept does influence attitude-behavior
consistency.
Self-concept threat.
Cognitive dissonance, as proposed by Aronson, relies on self-concept threat to
increase the target behavior. One view of reacting to such threat is self-completion theory.
Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1981) proposed that individuals use socially recognized
symbols to communicate their identities to others. To that end, individuals will seek out
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symbols that are consistent with whatever identity they wish to be associated. Later
research has looked into how individuals react to a threat to an identity they find
important. The results indicate that individuals will increase their efforts to seek out
symbols that are consistent with the threatened identity (Braun & Wicklund, 1989;
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). Aronson (1992) would argue that self-completion theory
is one of the “minitheories” (p. 307) that can better be explained by the more
encompassing cognitive dissonance theory.
Conceptualization
A new form o f environmentalism is shifting focus on the ecological behaviors of
individuals. While environmental attitudes remain high, there is ample research and other
indicators that it does not necessarily lead to ecological behavior (Dunlap & Van Liere,
1978; Kurz et al., 2007; Poortinga et al., 2004; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998; Scott & Willits,
1994; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981; Vining & Ebreo, 1992). The researcher will test the
first hypothesis to determine the strength of relationship between a general attitudinal
measure and a specific ecological behavior. The first hypothesis states:
Hi:

The correlation between environmental attitude and ecological behavior will be
significant, but weak.
Cognitive dissonance has been shown to reduce the gap between environmental

attitude and ecological behavior, especially when the self-concept is involved. A key
component o f cognitive dissonance is the realization of hypocrisy between attitudes and
behaviors. The current study addresses two points, asking the following. First, is
hypocrisy an agent in the environmental attitude-behavior gap? Second, can self-concept

14
threat that is different from cognitive dissonance paradigms have a similar reduction in
the environmental attitude-behavior gap?
Making one aware o f hypocrisy, the false claim to having admirable principles,
with regard to environmentalism, has been shown to be increase ecological behavior
(Aitken et al., 1994; Dickerson et al., 1992; Kantola et al., 1984). The researcher will test
the second hypothesis to determine whether hypocrisy is an agent in the environmental
attitude-behavior gap. The second hypothesis states:
H 2:

Environmental hypocrisy will be revealed in that participants will take an
opportunity to appear environmentally responsible without having to act that way.

The researcher will utilize Batson and colleagues’ (Batson et al., 1997) methodology for
exposing moral hypocrisy, but apply it to the environmental attitude-behavior gap.
Therefore, this study will explore the potential of an “environmental hypocrisy.”
Consistent with Batson’s work, the focus will be on situational, instead of dispositional,
factors.
Aronson’s stance on cognitive dissonance (1992) is that it works best when the
self-concept is involved. Other research has shown self-concept (identity) to have
predictive power above environmental attitudes. The researcher will induce self-concept
threat (Braun & Wicklund, 1989; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981) in a manner different
from traditional cognitive dissonance studies, to see if it reduces the environmental
attitude-behavior gap. The third hypothesis states:
H 3:

Threatening self-concept will lead to greater instances of ecological behavior.
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Methods
Participants completed an online survey to gather attitudinal measures. A week
later, participants took part in a laboratory experiment. The experiment involved deciding
to take one o f two surveys, either an environmental survey or one about fun campus
activities with a chance to win a raffle prize. The methodology to uncover hypocrisy was
similar to Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1997; Batson et al., 1999; Batson et al.,
2003; Batson & Thompson, 2001). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
experimental conditions: Control, Identified, and Threat. The impact of threat to selfconcept on expression o f hypocrisy was tested in the Threat condition.
Recall from above, that in a series of studies, Batson and colleagues created
situations that revealed moral hypocrisy. Participants utilized opportunities to appear
moral without having to act so. Batson et al. (1997) write that “the simplicity of our
dilemma made it relatively easy for us to unmask the nature of the moral motivation by
introducing ambiguity into the link between moral action and moral outcome, permitting
individuals to pursue self-interest without having to look selfish” (p. 1344). They called it
the moral action-outcome link, but this study will apply similar methodology to address
the environmental attitude-behavior gap. In the 1997 version of the study, Batson et al.
included moral responsibility measures. The current study will replace these with a
measure of environmental attitudes. One major difference between the Batson studies and
the present is that each participant will not be put in a dilemma that pits them against
another (fictitious) participant, but instead, the dilemma will pit a given participant’s
interests against each other.

16
Participants
Participants were students from the College of William and Mary research pool.
These are students enrolled in introductory psychology classes, who are required to fulfill
research participation as part of their class grade. A total of 167 participants signed up for
the study using the schools Internet-based research participant management software
(SONA systems). O f these, 27 were dropped from the study when they failed to complete
the online portion a week before the laboratory portion, eight did not show up for the
laboratory section, and one declined to participant after hearing the cover story, leaving
131 participants. O f these, two were dropped due to suspicious data patterns (inconsistent
answers to related measures). All data analysis was limited to the remaining 129
participants. O f these participants, 78 were female, 41 were male, and demographics were
not available for 10 participants. The average age was in the late teens (M = 18.9, SD =
1.08) with a range of 18 to 23 years of age.
Materials
Samples o f measures can be found in Appendix A.
Independent measures.
Environmental attitude was measured with the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP)
scale (Dunlap et al., 2000). The NEP measures a respondent’s “ecological worldview”,
thereby avoiding issues of specificity between the attitude measure and later behavior
measures. The NEP is a 15-item general attitude scale, measuring a respondent’s
agreement / disagreement with certain environmental statements (e.g., “Humans are
severely abusing the environment”). Responses were scored on a five-point scale ranging
from Strongly Agree, to Unsure, to Strongly Disagree (refer to Appendix A).
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Dependent measures.
Dependent measures included which survey participants chose and whether a coin
flip was used. The survey choice was a self-report measure measured in two ways. One
was with a dichotomous variable. The other way was a continuous variable. The use of a
coin flip was measured by two self-report measures, as well as experimenter observation.
One self-report measure asked if a coin was flipped, while the other probed whether the
coin flip was used to make the decision of surveys. The observation involved the
experimenter noting whether participants moved a precisely situated coin. A United
States quarter coin was placed next to the keyboard used by participants, with the head of
George Washington pointed up to the wall.
Manipulation checks.
The primary manipulation check was the preference for each of the surveys. This
was a self-report measure to the question of “how much of a sacrifice would it have been
to NOT choose Survey 1?” on a 7-point scale from 1 (no sacrifice at all) to 7 (large
sacrifice). This question was presented for each of the two surveys, in a randomized order.
The final manipulation checks involved self-report measures and debriefing
questioning by the experimenter about the amount of disappointment participants felt
about their performance on the online survey, and questions probing for suspicion about
the experiment.
Procedure
The study was carried out in two sections, an initial online survey followed by a
laboratory session a week later. Participants signed up for the study through the school’s
research participant management software (SONA Systems). They were informed that
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the study would take part in two sections, and that they would receive separate credits
upon completing each section. Participants selected a lab section from those posted. Eight
days before a participant’s scheduled laboratory section, they received an email with the
password to the online portion of the study. They had until midnight of the following day,
for a total window o f 48 hours, to complete the online surveys. Those that did not
complete the online portion by the deadline were dropped from the study (n = 27).
The online survey wording led participants to believe that they were receiving a
random set o f surveys from a pool of available surveys. This was in an effort to bolster
deception during the laboratory portion. In reality, all participants received the same set
of surveys. This included the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) along with filler surveys.
Participants read and signed informed consent forms before doing the surveys. The 140
participants that completed the online portion of the study received the first part of the
research credit.
Approximately a week after completing the online portion, participants came into
the lab during their scheduled time. Sessions were scheduled at 15-minute intervals, one
participant per session. Participants were escorted to the research room, were presented
with a cover story, and filled out the questionnaires. One of two male researchers, one of
whom was the author, conducted the laboratory sessions. No experimenter effects were
found in data analyses that used experimenter as a factor.
A representative script of the interaction is provided in Appendix B. Upon
entering the research room, the experimenter told the participant that the original
experiment was cancelled. The experimenter explained that the data collected during the
online portion o f the study was not producing the expected results, so the second portion
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would not be run. The experimenter offered the participant another study to complete
their research requirement.
The experimenter explained that of several campus organizations, two were eager
to collect survey data. Upon consulting the Psychology Department, the researchers were
told that they could give participants credit for completing one of the surveys.
Participants were asked if they wanted to do this for their research credit. All but one
participant agreed to do a survey to receive research credit.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the Control, Identified, or Threat
condition. The division was 18.6% in the Control condition, 18.6% in the Identified
condition, and 62.8% in the Threat condition. This division was determined due to the
expectation that most of the data analysis would occur within the Threat condition. The
other conditions were expected to serve as manipulation checks.
For the Control condition, the experimenter did not refer to the surveys completed
a week earlier. For the Identified condition, the experimenter mentioned he was trying to
figure out why the online survey from a week ago produced such unexpected results. He
said that everyone had a different mix of surveys, and asked if the participant
remembered which surveys they took. Whether or not the participant remembered (most
did not), the researcher glanced at a clipboard and mentioned that the participant most
likely completed a “general social battery” followed by mention of a “survey on
environmental attitudes.” He then told the participant that neither of these led to the
unexpected results from a week before, so he could not find out from the participant why
another of the surveys from a week ago produced such unexpected results. This was just a
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cover story for the Identified condition manipulation of knowing what surveys the
participant took a week prior.
For the Threat condition, the researcher followed a similar procedure as the
Identified condition, except for one change. After a brief glance at his clipboard, the
researcher said he had the participant’s scores available. He told the participant that his
or her environmental score was in the bottom 10% compared to other students that also
took the survey, suggesting that he or she “must not care too much about issues about the
environment.” He then told the participant that the score does not matter, as neither of
these surveys led to the unexpected results from a week before, so he could not find out
from the participant why another of the surveys from a week ago produced such
unexpected results. This was just a cover story for the Threat condition manipulation of
the low environmental attitudes score.
After the experimental manipulation, participants were told that the surveys were
placed on the computer in an effort to reduce the hassle of dealing with the paper versions.
They were instructed to follow the directions on the computer. The experimenter told
participants that he assured the campus organizations that he would provide a coin to all
participants in case the participant could not decide between the surveys.
The researcher then left the room. The participants read a brief description of the
two surveys (refer to Appendix A). One was titled as the “WM Social Activities Project.”
This was intended to be the preferred survey, and included a raffle ticket to win a $25 gift
card. It will be referred to as the FUN survey in the remainder of the paper. The other
survey was titles as the “Environmental Task Force.” This was intended to be the less
preferable survey, with mention of “monotonous” questions. However, the description for
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this survey also mentioned, “this is your opportunity to help us build a foundation that
will lead to environmentally responsible changes on campus” (refer to Appendix A). This
will be referred to as the ECO survey in the remainder of the paper. Participants were
then to decide which one they preferred, and reminded that, “[they] only need to
complete one to get research credit today.”
The participants made their choice on the computer. Then, the computer
administered a questionnaire about the decision-making process, which included the
dependent measures and manipulation checks. The experimenter then returned to the
room, checked whether the precisely placed coin had been moved, and informed
participants the experiment was complete. After probing for suspicion, the experimenter
debriefed them about the real purpose of the study.
Results
Analysis Strategy
As two versions o f the dependent variable were collected, one dichotomous and
one continuous, two types of regression analyses were utilized. The dichotomous variable
was analyzed with Logistic regression, while the continuous variable was analyzed with a
Generalized Linear model. As both yielded similar results, this section will focus on the
Logistic Regression. There was insufficient use of coin flip to perform the anticipated
logistic regression and chi-square analyses for this variable. Several manipulation check
variables were also analyzed. These include level of threat, which survey was more
alluring, and level of suspicion.
A two-tailed alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. Planned contrasts
were performed on hypothesized relationships, while post-hoc Tukey HSD and Tukey
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LD were used to explore further relationships. Of the 129 participants used, 24 were in
the Control condition, 24 were in the Identified condition, and 81 were in the Threat
condition. This unbalanced design was chosen to provide additional power in the single
condition expected to have major effects, the Threat condition.
Table 1 presents the variables used in the analysis. Dependent variables analyzed
were: dichotomous survey choice, continuous survey choice preference, coin flip choice.
Independent variables included: New Ecological Paradigm scores, and treatment
condition. Manipulation checks include: sacrifice to NOT do the ECO survey, sacrifice to
NOT do the FUN survey, a computed difference between the two sacrifice ratings, how
upset participants were with feedback, and how related participants thought the lab was to
the online survey.
One general manipulation check involved probing for suspicion. Many of the
participants showed genuine sympathy upon hearing the cover story intended to make
participants think that the lab and online portions of the study were not related. While the
averages for self-report o f suspicion that the two portions were related ranged from 3 to 4
on a 7-point scale— increasing from Control (M = 3.0, SD = 1.8), to Identified (M = 3.4,
SD = 2.0), to the Threat (M = 4.0, SD = 2.0) conditions— the difference did not prove to
be significant, F(2,126) = 2.67 p = .072. Post-Hoc testing using Tukey HSD showed the
contrast between the Control condition and Threat condition approaching significance, p
= .079. However, many participants noted little suspicion when debriefed about the true
nature of the study.

23
First Hypothesis
The first hypothesis stated that the correlation between environmental attitude and
ecological behavior will be significant, but weak. This was evaluated primarily with a
Pearson’s correlation. The Pearson’s correlation between New Ecological Paradigm
(NEP) and the dichotomous survey choice was r(129) = 25, p = .004. The Pearson’s
correlation between NEP and the continuous survey preference was r(129) = .37, p < .001.
This hypothesis also received support with significant predictors in the Logistic
regression and Generalized Linear Model analysis presented with the results for the third
hypothesis.
Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis stated that environmental hypocrisy would be revealed in that
participants would take an opportunity to appear environmentally responsible without
having to act that way. The main test for this hypothesis was the comparison of coin flip
and resulting survey choice. Whether the participant flipped the coin was measured by
self-report early in the battery of decision-making process questions. Only eight
participants reported that they flipped the coin— one of 24 in the Control condition (4%),
two of 24 participants in the Identified condition (8%), and five of 81 in the Threat
condition (6%). In addition to the percentages being similar across conditions, this was an
insufficient number to warrant statistical analysis between conditions, with cells having
expected values below five. Therefore, the second hypothesis could not be tested.
All but one of the participants that flipped the coin were in the Identified or Threat
condition. The continuous variable for survey preference, a measure taken after the
participants recorded which survey they would take, were within two points in favor for
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the chosen survey, except for that one participant. This could indicate that the
participants were reacting to reduce cognitive dissonance by adjusting their preference
based on the coin flip. Only the participant in the Control condition seemed to prefer the
FUN survey, yet chose the ECO survey based on a coin flip.
Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis stated that threatening self-concept would lead to greater
instances of ecological behavior. The main test for this hypothesis was the choice
between the two surveys. Refer to Table 2 for survey choice counts for each condition.
To provide for more meaningful beta-values, all continuous predictor variables were
converted to z-scores. These z-scores were used as predictors in the regression analyses.
Refer to Table 3 for a summary of the Logistic regression results. Binary Logistic
regression showed NEP and Condition to be significant when entered into the model
(Step chi-square = 21.2, p < .001). Contrasts across conditions show that participants in
both the Identified condition (.B = -1.59,/? = .015) and the Threat condition (B = -1.82,/?
= .001) had a significant tendency toward the FUN survey, as compared to participants in
the Control condition (set as the reference condition).
The results were confirmed with the continuous variable analyzed with a
Generalized Linear Model for scale response. NEP and Condition were significant
predictors (p < .001 andp = .005, respectively). When pair-wise comparison was done,
the Control condition differed significantly from the Identified condition, 7(1) = 2.43,/?
= .003, and Threat condition, 7(1) = 1.98,/? = .003. The Identified condition did not differ
significantly from the Threat condition 7(1) = 0.45,/? = .501.
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Two manipulation checks provided additional information relating to the third
hypothesis. These are the measure of sacrifice of NOT doing each survey and the level of
threat participants felt.
The manipulation check comparing ratings of how much of a sacrifice it was
NOT do each of the survey choices is available in Table 4. Due to computer data
collection issues, these data were not available for five participants (Control n = 22,
Identified n = 23, Threat n = 79). As individual differences were not as important as
within subject differences, a difference score was computed. A positive difference means
that participants thought that it was more of a sacrifice NOT to do the ECO survey than
the FUN survey, while a negative score meant the opposite. The means were: Control M
= 0.95, Identified M —-0.48, and Threat M = -0.42. ANOVA analysis indicated a
significant sacrifice difference across conditions, F(2,121) = 5.92,p = .004. Planned
contrasts showed Threat to differ from the other two /(121) = 2.05,p = .043. However,
the Control condition had the largest difference from the other two with

= 3 3 5 ,p

= .001. Post Hoc Tukey Homogeneous Subsets showed the Control condition in one
subset while the Identified and Threat conditions were in the other. This result parallels
the survey preference dependent variable with a high correlation (r(124) = .53,p < .001)
between survey preference and sacrifice rating.
Performing an analysis on the individual survey ratings led to sacrifice of NOT
doing the ECO survey mirroring the difference measure above, while the sacrifice of
NOT doing the FUN survey providing non-significant results. A between conditions
ANOVA of NOT doing the ECO survey yielded a significant result, F(2,121) = 5.72, p
= .004. Refer to Table 4 for the values for each condition. Planned contrasts showed the
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Threat condition to differ from the other two /(121) = 2.59, p = .011. However, the
Control condition had the largest difference from the other two, /(121) = 3.03,/? = .003.
Post Hoc Tukey Homogeneous Subsets showed the Control condition in one subset while
the Identified and Threat conditions were in the other. A between conditions comparison
of NOT doing the FUN survey yielded non-significant results, F(2,121) = 0.61, p = .51.
A check was also done to see if those in the Threat condition were more
disappointed about the results of the previous survey then those in the other conditions
(refer to Table 5). ANOVA results showed a between groups difference F(2,126) = 29.5,
p < .001. A Priori planned contrast analysis confirmed that the Threat condition differed
significantly from the other two, f( 126) = 7.76,/? < .001, while the Control and Identified
conditions did not differ significantly, t( 126) = 0.58,/? = .56.
Discussion
Only one hypothesis, that of a weak attitude-behavior link, was supported.
Hypotheses regarding environmental hypocrisy and the impact of self-concept threat on
the attitude-behavior gap were not supported. While the researcher expected to find low
ecological behavior and a way to increase it, instead, he found high ecological behavior
and a way to decrease it. The results indicate that environmental attitude and situational
factors did influence ecological behavior. Of note is the result that the ratings of sacrifice
of not doing each survey followed survey choice preference, instead of remaining
relatively consistent.
First Hypothesis
The first hypothesis, that there would be a small but significant correlation
between environmental attitude and ecological behavior, received support. The Pearson’s
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correlation between environmental attitude and both survey choice measures was
moderate. Logistic regression also showed environmental attitude to be a significant
predictor of survey choice, with one standard deviation increase in New Ecological
Paradigm (NEP) score increasing odds of choosing the ECO survey by 80%. Generalized
Linear Model analysis of the continuous variable also showed environmental attitude to
be a significant predictor o f survey choice with one standard deviation increase in NEP
score increasing the continuous survey choice measure by one point. These results are
consistent with other studies that show a small correlation (Kurz et al., 2007; Poortinga et
al., 2004; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998; Scott & Willits, 1994; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1978,
1981; Vining & Ebreo, 1992). Being that the general attitude measure lacked specificity
to the target ecological behavior of survey choice, the results are counter to some studies
that state the importance of attitude-behavior specificity (e.g., the General Ecological
Behavior scale, Kaiser, 1998).
Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis, that environmental hypocrisy would be revealed, did not
receive support. The main test for this hypothesis was to be the comparison of coin flip
and resulting survey choice. As in the Batson studies, should choice of any survey be
significantly different from 50% for those that flipped a coin, hypocrisy would be
revealed. However, only eight participants flipped a coin. Although the limited data show
some trend in the predicted direction that the Threat condition would see a lower rate of
coin flip than the Identified condition, there was insufficient data to rely on statistical
tests. The miniscule flip rates (4-8%) led this measure to be of no practical significance.
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.

28
Low instance o f coin flip.
This result undermines the primary attempt of this study to research
“environmental hypocrisy.” As the coin flip was so infrequent, statistical analyses could
not be run to determine survey choices beyond the expected probabilities provided by a
coin flip. Pilot studies could have allowed the researcher to tailor the instructions to result
in adequate variability in the instance of coin flip.
One interesting trend was that only one of the eight participants that flipped the
coin noted a survey preference different from their actual survey choice. This was also
the only participant that flipped a coin from Control condition. This may show a hint of
environmental hypocrisy, though there are not enough data points to confirm this.
Reading through the text entries for the participants, all noted using the coin for their
decision. Yet, as in the Batson studies, we cannot control to see how accurate this selfreport was. Similar to Batson et al.’s observation (1997), participants may have given
themselves options for aking their own choice. Another issue may be that the coin flip
influenced how the participants later answered the question about preference between
surveys. Perhaps they really had no preference until after the coin flip, and the forced
choice answer merely reflects an answer consistent with the coin flip result.
Perhaps the hypocrisy paradigm was active, but not via the coin flip. As
participants in the Control condition were not made aware that they had taken an
“environmental attitudes survey” the week prior, their higher choice of the ECO survey
may have been a primary way to appear environmentally aware. Alternatively, for
participants in the Identified and Threat conditions, the mention of having done the
environmental attitudes survey may have been all they needed to avoid being seen as
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hypocritical. In these cases, a coin flip may not have been a sufficient or necessary
mechanism for concealing hypocrisy.
Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis, that threatening self-concept will lead to a greater instance
of ecological behavior, failed to receive support. Based on the notion that self-concept
threat would lead to a change in survey choice, the expectation was that participants’
survey choices would be similar across the Control and Identified conditions. Counter to
this predictions, the Control condition stood apart from the other two with the highest
proportion of participants choosing the ECO survey, and the Identified and Threat
conditions had the similar levels. O f note is support for situational factors, in the form of
experimental condition, having significant influence on ecological behavior; though not
in the direction originally hypothesized. The manipulation check of sacrifice rating may
provide some insight.
Sacrifice ratings.
The researcher intended to create a scenario where participants preferred the FUN
survey to the ECO survey, across all conditions. However, the manipulation of making
the FUN survey more attractive than the ECO survey might not have been effective. The
difference score between ECO and FUN sacrifice ratings indicated that those in the
Control condition (M = 0.95) considered NOT doing the ECO survey as a larger sacrifice,
while those in the Identified and Threat conditions (M = -0.48, M = -0.42, respectively)
considered NOT doing the FUN survey to be more of a sacrifice. When comparing
differences between groups on each survey’s sacrifice rating, the difference was only
significant for the ECO ratings and not the FUN ratings. Apparently, by having no
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indication of having already taken a form of an environmental measure a week before,
those in the Control condition rated the sacrifice of not doing the ECO survey higher than
not doing the FUN survey.
The sacrifice rating trend mirrors the results of both the actual choice of surveys
and continuous survey choice, discussed later. With the current design, it is not possible
to determine causality o f such responses; whether someone chose the ECO survey first
and consequently rated the sacrifice as higher, or whether the sacrifice ratings drove the
survey choices. The fact that the self-report of sacrifice was collected after participants
chose the survey and gave their preference ratings, is not enough to detangle primacy.
Independent preference ratings (outside of the experimental manipulation) may have
provided more insight or allowed tailoring the survey presentation to reach the desired
impact. However, as the Control condition received no experimental manipulation, it
might be deemed the best reflection of actual survey preference. This lack of making the
FUN survey substantially more appealing may be a major experimental flaw.
The lack o f preference for the FUN survey may be a significant finding in its own
right, underscoring the degree to which college students internalize the importance of
environmental concern. Even a chance to win a $25 gift card was not enough to make the
sacrifice rating for the FUN survey higher than that of the ECO survey. That the
Indentified and Threat conditions switched the relative ordering of sacrifice rating, for the
FUN survey being more of a sacrifice, may be a sign that cognitive dissonance was
invoked. In response to the knowledge that they had done an environmental measure the
week before, these participants adjusted their preference to justify the FUN survey.
Though not an original hypothesis, perhaps the action to justify the FUN survey is an
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indicator of cognitive dissonance, if not hypocrisy. Should this be the case, it is in
contrast to typical cognitive dissonance experiments that rely on the counter-attitudinal
advocacy paradigm, and is more in-line with Dickerson et al.’s (1992) application to proattitudinal situations.
However, if participants really preferred the ECO survey, why did those in the
Identified and Threat condition switch to the FUN survey? It would appear that
knowledge o f having done an environmental measure a week earlier was enough to move
participants in the intended direction of preference for the FUN survey. The fact that the
effect was similar between the Identified and Threat conditions speaks to knowledge of
having done an environmental survey being more influential than invoking self-concept
threat. This finding will receive further consideration in the Future Research section,
relating to an environmental quota and real world parallels.
One note of caution is in the interpretation of this measure’s wording: “How
much of a sacrifice would it have been to NOT choose the ECO survey.” In addition to
potentially being confusing, awareness of social norms and expectations of ecological
behavior may have influenced self-report apart from actual desires. Unfortunately, the
wording was necessary because of trying to distinguish this measure from other similarly
worded measure that preceded it.
Another point of experimental execution may also be to blame. This concerns the
issue of unintentional environmental priming by telling participants that the surveys were
placed on the computer in an effort to reduce the hassle of dealing with the paper versions.
Though this statement does not directly address reduction of paper for environmental
reasons, participants could have interpreted that the researcher was concerned about the
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environmental impact o f the paper. Batson et al. (1997) addressed potential flaws
similar to this by not setting off alarm bells and nullifying any “psychological space” for
participants to move in. This potential priming may make the later environmental quota
discussion more relevant.
Survey choice.
The ratio o f survey choice was counter to expectations. The prediction was that
participants in the Control and Identified conditions would show similar levels of
preference, predominantly in favor of the FUN survey. Participants in the Threat
condition were expected to have a higher preference for the ECO survey than the
aforementioned two conditions. Instead, the result was that those in the Control condition
stood apart from the other two by having the highest proportion of participants choosing
the ECO survey. This may be in part due to a lack of impact of the self-concept threat
manipulation, leaving the major difference between conditions up to whether participants
were informed that they had taken an environmental attitudes survey a week prior to
coming to the lab. Therefore, participants in the Control condition were uninformed
(unaware or not mindful) of having done an environmental attitudes survey a week prior,
while those in the Identified and Threat conditions were informed (aware or mindful).
Similar to reasoning presented concerning the sacrifice ratings, the impact of proattitudinal manipulation may have led to results different from those based on cognitive
dissonance using the counter-attitudinal paradigm. By making participants in the
Identified and Threat conditions informed about having done an environmental attitudes
survey a week prior, the message was opposite that of counter-attitudinal messages that
participants do NO T perform the behaviors. This message that the action was performed
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may lead to the environmental quota concept discussed later. Instead of dissonance,
participants may have experienced a suppression effect similar to the goal fulfillment
effect o f Forster, Liberman, and Higgins (2005) discussed later.
Measure o f self-concept threat.
Although the manipulation check of disappointment with results was in the right
direction, it was weaker than expected. The averages for the Control and Identified
groups were 1.71 and 1.46, respectively (refer to Table 5). Although most should have
answered with a value o f zero for this question— that they did not get results or remember
their performance— these values are low enough to indicate a lack of threat in these
conditions. The average value for the Threat condition of 3.67 (SD = 1.74) reflected that
many were somewhat disappointed (4 = “somewhat upset”) with the feedback that they
had scored low on the environmental attitudes survey a week prior. The data reveal that
some reached the upper end of the seven-point scale (7 = “very upset”), but overall the
impact was lower than perhaps necessary to invoke the self-concept threat that Aronson
deems so critical to cognitive dissonance (Aronson, 1992). The significant difference in
threat ratings between those in the Identified and Threat condition, while having no
significant difference on the survey choice, further supposes that the threat manipulation
was not the main factor influencing survey choice.
Future Research
The results attained by this study may be better explained by alternative theory.
Presented next is a notion of an “environmental quota”, presented under the theories of
unpriming and goal achievement. Real world parallels to this study’s results will also be
covered, along with general notes on modifying follow-up studies.
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Environmental quota.
The unexpectedly strong sacrifice rating for the ECO survey over the FUN survey
in the Control condition may shed light on the strength of an ecological behavior prime.
Even a chance to win a $25 gift card was not enough to make the sacrifice rating for the
FUN survey higher than that of the ECO survey. However, given information that they
may have previously accomplished the goal of ecological behavior, participants in the
Identified and Threat conditions may have been “unprimed” of a cultural prime (Sparrow
& Wegner, 2006).
Priming occurs when an earlier stimulus affects responses to a later stimulus. As
mentioned before, there may have been unintentional environmental priming by telling
participants that the surveys were placed on the computer in an effort to reduce the hassle
of dealing with the paper versions. However, why would this lead to more ECO survey
choice in one condition and not the other two? One notion may be that the participants
were primed to personally perform an ecological behavior. Those in the Control
condition had only one way to satisfy that prime, by choosing the ECO survey. However,
those in the Identified and Threat conditions had evidence that they had already
performed an ecological behavior a week prior, leaving them a reason to be released from
the prime. The current results are insufficient to deduce whether this priming effect was
due to this experiment or a general cultural prime. It is also unclear as to the role of a
self-presentation effect o f the experimenter knowing the status of the participants’
ecological behaviors.
Sparrow and W egner’s (2006) introduction provides a succinct example of
unprimint. They discuss someone being primed by the word “burrito” to eat at a Mexican
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restaurant. However, being in the restaurant would further prime them with Mexican
food, leaving them to spend days at the restaurant. Therefore, their research was geared to
show that engaging in the primed behavior diminishes the prime. The methodology was
based on instructing participants to answer simple yes/no questions in a random way.
However, participants tended to answer in a manner biased toward the correct answers.
The only way this tendency was reduced was to allow participants to indicate the correct
answer before generating a random yes/no.
Sparrow and W egner’s study included tests of other explanations for unpriming.
This included repetition of random answering (experiment 2), supraliminal exposure to
the correct and incorrect answer (experiment 3), a general acknowledgement to the
experimenter that the answer was known (experiment 4), and correct answering of an
unrelated question (experiment 5). None of these led to a reduction in the bias toward
answering questions correctly. Only the part of experiment 4 that had participants express
the answer to themselves, also yielded the unpriming effect consistent with the direct
correct answering o f experiment 1. Therefore, this study indicates that the participant
must overtly and specifically answer a question correctly in order to unprime the correct
answer bias.
Pertaining to the current work, the idea is that many people may have a cultural
tendency to selecting ecological behaviors when available. However, similar to the
findings of Sparrow and Wegner, once evidence is presented that the behavior has been
performed, there may be a reduction in this cultural tendency. The literature on catharsis,
completion, and updating suggests that psychological theorists have often recognized that
behavior prompted by a stimulus can naturally reduce the propensity toward subsequent
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stimulus-related behavior (Sparrow & Wegner, 2006). Participants of the current study
were in a situation similar to those in experiments 1 and 4 of Sparrow and Wegner, in that
they were informed that it was in fact they that had done the environmental attitudes
survey a week earlier. Should this unpriming theory be pursued in future versions of this
study, alternatives similar to those of Sparrow and Wegner’s should be used. It is my
expectation that similar results would occur, in that the shift to the FUN study would only
occur for those participants that gained information that they had actually performed an
ecological behavior recently. O f interest would be to inform participants that others had
performed the ecological behavior recently, or more in-line with cognitive dissonance
paradigms, that they had not performed the ecological behavior recently. Perhaps
mechanisms of social norms and cognitive dissonance would reinforce preference for the
ECO survey. This would further illuminate the notion of whether there is a desire that the
ECO survey be done— regardless of who does it— or is it important to the participant that
they are the ones to do it. Future versions of this study should also address the influence
o f self-presentation to the experimenter.
Forster, Liberman, and Higgins (2005) found an effect similar to Sparrow and
Wegner’s (2006) unpriming. However, they noted this effect to goal-influenced
accessibility as being different from priming. They believe that priming is much shorter
lived. Forster et al. (2005) performed experiments that involved lexical decision making
and stroop effect measures. They found that participants with an unachieved goal (i.e.,
finding a picture of glasses followed by scissors) had better accessibility then those
without that goal or those who had already achieved the goal. Further research based on
this study could attempt to tease apart this nuance whether priming or goals led to the
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current results. More intentional priming could be performed to see if priming
increases the preference for the ECOsurvey, and whether subsequent prime fulfillment
results in even lower levels o f ECO preference. Alternatively, an overt goal could be used
instead of priming, and the results compared. Finally, the impact of the current
procedure— noting noting that a computer was used to reduce the hassle of paper— could
be evaluated to see if in fact it unwittingly primed participants.
One part o f the Forster et al.’s (2005) discussion warrants further evaluation. The
authors mention that whilst some standards, such as being egalitarian, may be instantiated
but not fulfilled, goals, such as “showing a token of egalitarian behavior”, can be fulfilled.
The current study may reflect this focus on behavior that can be fulfilled— in having
performed an ecological behavior— apart from a more difficult standard of being an
environmentalist. Therefore, some of the concerns of reduced ecological behavior upon
being informed of a history of such, might not necessarily carry over into concerns of
lowering more global virtues of environmental concern. Participants may have
experienced ecological behavior suppression in the short term, without any impact on
their instantiated standard o f environmental concern.
Ledgerwood, Liviatan, and Camevale (2007), whose symbolic self-completion
approach would fall under those theories that Aronson (1992) argued to be a part of
cognitive dissonance, point to a similar mechanism. They found that once group
affirmation was achieved, a striving toward a group-identity goal was reduced or even
eliminated.
Recently emerging research indicates that upriming or quotas may apply to even
broader realms. Mazar and Zhong (2009) found that exposure to green products, seen as
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socially responsible, actually led participants to higher levels of asocial and unethical
behavior in other realms. The authors proposed that boosting self-image with the green
products actually permitted a higher level of transgression of social norms, as if the net of
behavior was significance. This research does an interesting job of combining the
centrality o f self-concept as proposed by Aronson, while also addressing the sense of
morality that is key to the Batson studies (Batson et al., 1997). Perhaps participants that
knew of their past week’s environmental survey gave themselves “environmental credits”
to justify selecting the FUN survey. Other popular works also warn of effects similar to
the environmental quota, in that “removing the guilt trip may lead to an overall increase
in carbon emissions” (MacDonald, 2008, p. 233).
Dickerson et al. (1992) dismiss priming interpretations in their experiments. All
but the Control condition were primed with the idea of water conservation, but those in
the Hypocrisy condition still performed differently. There were equal turning off shower
results across all treatment conditions (Mindful-only, Commitment-only, and
Hypocrisy-both), but the length o f shower was shortest in the Hypocrisy condition. The
authors mention that participants in the Mindful and Commitment conditions took the
first easy step, but only those in the Hypocrisy condition took meaningful action. Those
in the Mindful and Commitment conditions acted in line with Batson’s work of appearing
but not really acting a given way. Only those who were made to see their hypocrisy, those
in the Hypocrisy condition, took meaningful action. I inadvertently setup a different
scenario. Instead o f highlighting a lack of action, participants in the Identified and Threat
condition were informed that they had taken action a week prior. The informed state may
have led to an effect similar to Sparrow and Wegner’s unpriming.
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Real world parallels.
Real world analysis of energy efficiency gains seems to parallel this study’s
results. Economists refer to the effect of reducing potential gains by altering other
behaviors as “consuming the gains” (Gladwell, 2009). While Gladwell discusses how this
plays out in areas such as automobile safety, others have applied it to environmental
issues. For example, when low-income homes are made more energy efficient, some of
the potential energy gains are “consumed” by residents turning up their heat (Boardman
& Milne, 2000). Similarly, when drivers realize that they have a more fuel-efficient
vehicle, they tend to “consume” their efficiency gains by driving more miles or driving
faster (Small & Dender, 2005). Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2008) give further examples
of consuming gains by buying more cars, buying larger cars, and sharing them less.
Pertaining to efficiency gains in washing machines, they point to buying more machines,
buying larger machines, and using them more frequently and/or reducing the size of the
average load. Perhaps the participants in this study revealed signs of a similar effect.
Having been informed that they had achieved an ecological behavior the week prior,
participants “consumed” the potential gains of again taking ecological action by choosing
the FUN survey.
General future modifications.
In this study, neutral and negative feedback (Identified and Threat conditions,
respectively) led to similar results. A follow-up study may consider the impact of a
positive feedback condition. Would a similar mechanism of environmental quota hold for
positive feedback, or would positive feedback increase ecological behavior? The role of
accurate feedback, instead o f feedback based on experimental condition, could also be
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studied. Finally, follow-on study could address the influence of feedback regarding
other participants’ actions. Would environmental quota occur if a participant was told
that others took an environmental survey a week prior?
On a more general note, future research should delve even deeper to identify more
contexts that shape actual behaviors. I agree with Uzzell and Rathzel (2009), that there is
no linear progression from information to attitude to behavior, and that “behaviours need
to be analysed in their specific social and environmental contexts and within the larger
context o f the consumer societies in which we live” (p.9). Less experimentally restricted
methodologies may better reveal the mechanisms that lead to the current study’s results.
However, the rigor o f experimental control does limit the number of alternative
explanations that need to be considered for the current results.
Limitations
Some of the speculation based on the current results needs further research. The
experimental design may limit generalizability of such conclusions. Succinctly, while
taking one environmental survey will be enough not to take another, would buying a
hybrid vehicle prevent someone from then recycling? Surprisingly, the work of Mazar
and Zhong (2009) indicates that even more distal results are possible. Symbolic self
completion theory relies on individuals seeking out “socially recognized indicators of the
desired identity” (Braun & Wicklund, 1989). Perhaps the ECO survey was not salient
enough to be a clear cut “socially recognized” symbol of ecological behavior.
This study also had limitations related to self-report. Although direct behavioral
measurement avoids the self-report issue, it can limit the complexity and scope of a study.
One way to reduce these limitations may be work in line with Rochester Interaction
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Record modeling (Nezlek, Schiitz, & Sellin, 2007), in which a complex set of
behaviors can be cataloged. Although this method still relies on self-report, the rigorous
methodology helps ensure that reports are for actual behaviors recalled from a
participant’s daily life. Electronic response monitoring may help boost the validity of
Rochester Interaction Record modeling even further.
The other major limitation deals with the experimental design overly simplifying
the results in terms of social context. Biga (2006) touts sociological perspectives’
advantage in “that humans are embedded in a social structure where behavior is chosen
not on the basis o f discrete, personal decisions, but on the basis of competing demands
stemming from the many positions one assumes in society” (p.77). This study was
limited in terms of addressing social context such as self-presentation and socially
recognized indicators. The effect of self-presentation was not well controlled in the
experiment, and cannot be accounted for. Goffman (1959) underscored the importance of
“front stage” presentation as a means of meeting our social roles. One way that the
impact of self-presentation could have been minimized would have been to tell
participants that the experimenter would not see which survey they chose. The contrary
may have happened with part of the script stating that enough participants had been
choosing each survey; implying experimenter monitoring.
Conclusion
Only one o f three hypotheses, that of a weak attitude-behavior link, was supported.
Hypotheses regarding environmental hypocrisy and the impact of self-concept threat on
the attitude-behavior gap were not supported. While the researcher expected to find low
ecological behavior and a way to increase it, instead, he found high ecological behavior
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and a way to decrease it. Finally, environmental attitude and situational factors did
influence ecological behavior.
The possibility o f an environmental quota may prove useful in both understanding
and influencing ecological behavior. Such a response may serve a useful function, by
limiting the amount of time devoted to any given social influence. Further research into
this effect may improve efficacy of behavior change efforts. Although an environmental
quota effect may limit some behavior, it may also point to a minimum expected social
limit. As long as the current social norms move this expectation higher, ecological
behavior is bound to increase. Such action is necessary to address concern about global
climate change. Real world experience that energy efficiency gains may be “consumed”
by a take back effect (Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008) or environmental quota effect
should help policy makers realize that standards on energy efficiency will not be
sufficient to impact overall energy consumption. With large amounts of United States
stimulus money going to energy efficiency efforts, such realizations may lead to more
balanced efforts for reducing overall energy usage.
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Appendix A: Measures
New Ecological Paradigm
{Dunlap et al. (2000) Measuring Endorsement of
the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP
Scale}
Circle your choice SA=Strongly Agree, MA=Mildly Agree, U=Unsure,
MD=Mildly Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree
Dci you agree or disagree that:
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people
the earth can support

SA

MA

u

MD SD

2. Humans have the right to modify the natural
environment to suit their needs

SA

MA

U

MD SD

3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces
disastrous consequences

SA

MA

U

MD SD

4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make
the earth unlivable

SA

MA

U

MD SD

5. Humans are severely abusing the environment

SA

MA

U

MD SD

6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just
learn how to develop them

SA

MA

U

MD SD

7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to
exist

SA

MA

U

MD SD

8. The balance o f nature is strong enough to cope with
the impact of modern industrial nations

SA

MA

U

MD SD

9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to
the laws of nature

SA

MA

U

MD SD

10. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind
has been greatly exaggerated

SA

MA

U

MD SD

11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room
and resources

SA

MA

U

MD SD

12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature

SA

MA

U

MD SD

13. The balance o f nature is very delicate and easily upset

SA

MA

U

MD SD

14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how
nature works to be able to control it

SA

MA

U

MD SD

15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon
experience a major ecological catastrophe

SA

MA

U

MD SD
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Survey Option Presentation
(Paper-based representation ofMediaLab computer presentation)
Survey 1 and 2 were randomly assigned either the ECO (ETF) or FUN (WMSAP) survey.
•

The online portion o f our original study did not give the results we were
looking for, so we had to abandon it. However, in order to fulfill our
obligation to get you research participation credit, we were able to get surveys
from two campus organizations. Read the summary for each survey. You will
then be asked to participate in ONE of them for your research credit.

•

Survey choices (randomized)
Survey 1: WM Social Activities Project (WM-SAP)
Have you ever heard that, "a university experience is about more than just
academics"? Social activities are a key component of a balanced education.
In that effort, the William and Mary Social Activities Project sets out to
gauge student insight on fun, social activities to make life at William and
Mary a more pleasant experience. This survey provides you with the
opportunity to give feedback on what social activities you have enjoyed,
and what else you would recommend. The information is shared amongst
the numerous student organizations. Past surveys have led to new
organizations and events. In line with making students' experience a good
one, the survey is fun and engaging (this is not your typical boring survey).
PLUS, all survey participants for this session will be entered in a raffle for
a $25 gift card to a merchant of your choice—within reason ;-).
Help make life at William and Mary even better. We want to hear from
you.
Survey 2: Environmental Task Force (ETF)
We are a new group formed in the hopes of addressing environmental
concerns on campus. You can participate in a survey to gauge what can be
done on campus to reduce environmental impact. This is a preliminary
survey, so we hope you see the value of answering what some may
consider "monotonous" questions. This is your opportunity to help us
build a foundation that will lead to environmentally responsible changes
on campus.

•

Now decide which survey you would like to participate in. You can only do
one.
If you do not want to make the decision yourself, use the coin provided to
decide.

52

Survey Choice Questions
(Paper-based representation of MediaLab computer presentation)
Survey 1 and 2 were randomly assigned either the ECO or FUN survey. {Text} in
brackets reflects variable name used.
•

•

•

Which survey did you choose? {Survey}
Survey 1

Survey 2

Did you flip the coin? (corroborated by experimenter) {CoinFlip}
Yes

No

Did you use a coin flip to decide? {Coin}
Yes

No

•

Indicate any comments about your decision (e.g. flipped several times, used
other method to decide): {Decide}

•

Indicate how strongly you leaned toward survey 1 or 2. {Lean}
Survey 1 strongly
6
5
4

•

3

somewhat difficult
4

5

6

very difficult
7

How much o f a sacrifice would it have been to NOT choose Survey 1?
(randomized with following) {Surl}
no sacrifice at all
1
2

•

4

Survey 2 strongly
5
6

Indicate how difficult a decision it was to decide between survey 1 and 2.
{Difficult}
not at all difficult
1
2

•

3

Survey 1 mildly / Survey 2 mildly
2
1
1
2
3

somewhat a sacrifice
4
3
5

large sacrifice
6
7

How much of a sacrifice would it have been to NOT choose Survey 2?
(randomized with previous) {Sur2}
no sacrifice at all
1
2

somewhat a sacrifice
3
4
5

6

large sacrifice
7
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Debriefing Probing Questions
{ Paper-based representation of MediaLab computer presentation }
•

Do you recall what the surveys you took online a week ago were about?
{Recall}
Yes
No
o (If yes was selected) Try to identify what the surveys were about. Be
brief, and do not think too hard about it if you cannot immediately
remember. Use [GO BACK] and select NO if you realize you cannot
recall: {Recall2}

•

In general, how do you feel about the online surveys from a week ago?
very negative
1
2

3

neutral
4

5

6

very positive
7

•

How upset or disappointed with the results from the online survey from a
week ago? {Dispt}
Did not
get results not at all upset
somewhat upset
very upset
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

•

BEFORE you made the decision on which survey to take, how related did you
think today's surveys were to the online surveys from a week ago? {Related}
Not at all related
1
2

3

somewhat related
4

5

part of the same study
6
7

•

BEFORE you made the decision on which survey to take, what did you think
this experiment was about?

•

NOW, what do you think this experiment was about?

54

Appendix B: Laboratory Scripts

Debriefing Script
{Non-verbatim presented by experimenter}
“This experiment was a bit different than how we presented it. The initial
survey and your decision today were related. In particular, we were trying to
learn more about the relationship between environmental attitude surveys
and actual behavior. One of the questionnaires you filled out was the New
Ecological Paradigm. It assesses general environmental attitudes. However,
there has been numerous research showing that this measure does not
predict actual behavior well. Some have researched how a more specific
measure correlates with specific behaviors. For example, a question on
“how likely are you to recycle” will better predict whether you actually do it
than asking “is recycling important?”
In this experiment, we wanted to test something a bit different. Our theory is
that the situation people are put in impacts how consistent they act with their
general environmental attitudes. Everyone takes the same questionnaires,
and is given the option of the same two “surveys”. The only difference is
whether we reminded you of the online survey and whether you got
feedback on your performance.
For those in the CONTROL condition, we never reminded them of the NEP
questionnaire, and no results were given once you filled it out. For those in
the IDENTIFIED condition, we reminded them that they took the NEP
questionnaire on environmental attitudes. For those in the THREAT
condition, we reminded them that they took the NEP questionnaire on
environmental attitudes and false feedback was provided. Everyone in this
condition was told they scores LOW on the NEP. This was entirely made up,
and you could have scored anywhere from low to very high on the NEP.
However, we wanted to see how people react when they are told that they
score low on the NEP. Our belief is that those that consider themselves
environmentalists will have that image of themselves threatened, hence the
name THREAT condition. We think they will look for opportunities to
reassert their environmental commitment. Therefore, we think these people
will be more likely to choose the environmental survey over the survey that
provided other rewards.
This is not to say that there is any better way to be, just that different
circumstances influence individuals differently. We expect most people to
choose the survey that is fun and offers a chance to win a gift card. Your
choice did not impact your ability to be in the raffle for the gift card.
Everyone will be in the raffle, and we will give out two $25 gift cards once
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our experiment is over. We will send you an email if you should win the
raffle drawing.
Does all of this make some sense now? Do you have any further questions?
As you can imagine, if you knew ahead of time what the experiment was
about, you may have made different choices. We ask you to sign an
agreement not/to disclose the true nature of this experiment to anyone until
the semester is over. You can just tell them it is about questionnaires’
influence on how you perform certain cognitive tasks.”
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Laboratory Treatment Script
R is the researcher with scripted dialog
P is the participant with typical dialog.
(Check to see if participant is outside)
R: Hi, are you xxxx?
P: Yes.
R: Alright, come on in. We are going to be in the back room here. (Leads
participant into research room) Well, unfortunately what I originally planned for
the second part o f this experiment will not work. You remember taking an online
survey a week ago? Well, the data from that totally wasn’t doing what I had
excepted, so it does not make sense to do the second part.
P: Oh, sorry to hear that.
R: However, as we had a commitment to you signed up for timeslots, we talked to
some campus organizations1. Two said that they’d be thrilled to get some surveys
filled out by students. I was told that I could let you take one of the surveys to
receive research credit for coming in today. Would you like to do that?
P: Sure, that sounds great.
R: Alright, go ahead and read and sign this consent form. Even thought these are
not our surveys, we still need to get your consent as we are the ones administering
them to you. It basically says that I am not forcing you to take the surveys, and
that you can quit at any time. (Enters participant ID into the computer)
(Once participant has finished signing the consent form one of three conditions is
run)
Condition 1 (Control)

1 Some participants were told that student organizations were contacted, while others were told
that these were campus organizations. There was some back and forth early in the experiment
while the script was not well entrenched. Also, mention by one student in debriefing revealed that
they know many student organizations, which led them to be suspicious o f not having know these.
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R: (Makes no mention about the surveys from a week prior)
Condition 2 (Identified)
R: (in a perplexed voice, eliciting help from participant) I am still trying to figure
out what happened with the surveys from a week ago. Do you remember which
ones you had in your set.. .everyone had a different mix.
P: I really do not recall, perhaps if you tell me I will remember.
R: That is fine, I actually have the codes for them here, and can probably figure it
out from memory. Let’s see.. .23.. .that was a general social battery, everyone
took that one.. .and 54.. .that was the survey on environmental attitudes. Does that
sound familiar?
P: Yeah, I think I took that.
R: Well, neither of those were the ones that gave me trouble. Oh well, I still don’t
know what happened. I guess William and Mary students are just different from
what I expected.
Condition 3 (Threat)
R: (in a perplexed voice, eliciting help from participant) I am still trying to figure
out what happened with the surveys from a week ago. Do you remember which
ones you had in your set.. .everyone had a different mix.
P: I really do not recall, perhaps if you tell me I will remember.
R: That is fine, I actually have the codes for them here, and can probably figure it
out from memory. Let’s see.. .23.. .that was a general social battery, everyone
took that one.. .and 54.. .that was the survey on environmental attitudes. Does that
sound familiar?
P: Yeah, I think I took that.
R: You scored in the bottom 10% of people that had that one. You must not care
too much about issues about the environment. Well, neither of those were the
ones that gave me trouble. Oh well, I still don’t know what happened. I guess
William and Mary students are just different from what I expected.
All conditions
R: Anyhow, I put all the surveys on the computer so that I would not have to deal
with a stack of paper afterwards (hand gesture to indicate expecting a large stack
of paper). The instructions are on the computer, so just read them carefully.
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Basically, there is a short description of each survey. Please read both of them
carefully and decide which survey you would like to do, you only need to
complete one to get research credit today. I also told the organizations that I
would provide you with a coin to flip2, (most participants snickered at the idea of
needing a coin to decide between surveys) (While exiting the room) Go ahead and
open the door to let me know when you are done.

2 The wording was changed from, “I also told the organizations that I would provide you with a
coin to flip in case you cannot decide on your own.”
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Table 1
Description o f Variables Used in Analysis

Variable

Description

TyPe

range

CoinFlip

Whether a coin flip
occurred

dichotomous

1 = flip
2 = no flip

Cond

Which condition
the participant was
in

categorical

1 = Control
2 = Identified
3 - Threat

Dispt

How upset
Participant was
with feedback

likert

0 = no feedback
1 = not upset
4 = somewhat upset
7 = very upset

Lean

Survey preference

likert

1 = FUN strong
6 = Fun weak
7 = ECO weak
12 = ECO strong

NEP

New Environmental
Paradigm score

continuous

0 -7 5

Related

Suspicion of online
and lab portions of
study being related

likert

1 = not related
4 = somewhat related
7 = part same study

Surl

How much a
sacrifice to NOT do
the ECO survey

likert

1 = no sacrifice
4= somewhat
sacrifice
7 = large sacrifice

Sur2

How much a
sacrifice to NOT do
the FUN survey

likert

1 = no sacrifice
4= somewhat
sacrifice
7 = large sacrifice
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Description

Type

range

SurDiff

A difference score
of Surl and Sur2

Continuous

-6 = FUN much
higher sacrifice
0 = same sacrifice
6 = ECO much higher
sacrifice

Survey

Choice between
two surveys (FUN,
ECO)

dichotomous

1 = FU N
2 = ECO

Variable
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Table 2
Dichotomous Survey Choice by Condition

Condition
Count for Survey

Control

Identified

Threat

ECO

18

9

29

FUN

6

15

52

75%b

38%a

36%a

% ECO

Note: Tukey Homogeneous Subset 1 indicated with a.
Tukey Homogeneous Subset 2 indicated with b.
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Table 3
Summary o f Logistic Regression Analysis fo r Variables Predicting Survey Choice

Variable
zNEP

B

SEB

Exp(B)

Sig.

0.587

0.204

1.80

.004

Condition

.005

Condition (Identified)

-1.594

0.658

0.203

.015

Condition (Threat)

-1.820

0.556

0.162

.001

Constant

0.028

0.233

1.028

.905

Note: Control condition was used as the reference for Condition.
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Table 4
Sacrifice Scores fo r N O T Doing Each Survey Type

Condition
Survey

Control

Identified

Threat

ECO

3.09b

2.17a

1.96a

FUN

2.14

2.65

2.38

Difference

0.95b

-0.48a

-0.42a

Note: Tukey Homogeneous Subset 1 indicated with a.
Tukey Homogeneous Subset 2 indicated with b.
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Table 5
Disappointment Rating fo r Each Condition

Control

Identified

Threat

______________________ M (SD )____________ M (SD )____________ M (SD)
Disappointment

1.71 (1.0)b

1.46(0.8)b

Note: Planned contrast subset 1 indicated with a.
Planned contrast subset 2 indicated with b.

3.67(1.7)a
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